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Dual Status Command 
for No-Notice Events: 
Integrating the Military Response to Domestic Disasters 
Ludwig J. Schumacher 
ABSTRACT : 
This article describes the history of the 
challenges in developing structures and 
processes to integrate military forces 
during domestic disaster response, and the 
recent progress made with regard to 
employing a Dual Status Command 
construct for no-notice events. Absent this 
recent initiative enabled by the Council of 
Governors, our nation would employ the 
same construct which was roundly 
criticized as a major factor and significant 
causal factor for hampering the military 
response to Hurricane Katrina – through 
separate and uncoordinated chains of 
command, state military forces would be 
employed under the control of the 
governor, and any federal military forces 
would be employed under the control of the 
president. The new Dual Status Command 
construct is a transformative initiative 
which, if implemented, will affect 
meaningful progress, for the benefit of both 
state and nation. 
 
It has now been five years since 
Hurricane Katrina. In that time, we have 
seen a flurry of documents identifying 
domestic response lessons for our 
nation’s military, catalogued in reports 
by the House, Senate, White House, 
commissions and think tanks. There 
certainly is abundant evidence that we 
have been moving in the right direction 
in many areas. There have been 
improvements between the National 
Guard and the Department of Defense 
(DoD) in the areas of planning, training, 
joint exercises, and communications. 
This article will address the long 
impasse, and significant recent progress, 
with regard to the most critical military 
deficiency identified during Hurricane 
Katrina: the requirement to properly 
configure command and control 
arrangements for state and federal 
military forces responding to domestic 
disasters. 
Military command relationships for 
domestic operations need to be sorted 
out in advance of an event. The proper 
integration of military forces results in 
the most-effective, most-coordinated 
use of limited resources. Integration 
constructs with the best potential for 
success are those that recognize state 
and federal authorities inherent in our 
federalist system of government. To 
date, vesting a military commander with 
both state and federal authorities (e.g. a 
dual status command) has proven 
successful during several large-scale 
planned events, such as national 
political conventions and the recent 
presidential inauguration. Governors 
and the secretary of defense are 
currently close to jointly endorsing the 
expanded use of dual status command 
beyond planned events, to now include 
no-notice events. This proposal has the 
potential to enable us to overcome the 
single greatest challenge currently facing 
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our nation’s military when responding 
to domestic disasters. 
Hurricane Katrina: An 
Uncoordinated Military Response 
Under our federal system of governance, 
there is a constitutional basis for distinct 
and separate chains of command for 
state and federal military forces. During 
disaster response missions, National 
Guard soldiers and airmen typically 
operate under the control of the state 
governors in a Title 32 or State Active 
Duty status. The president has 
historically directed responding federal 
military forces operating in a Title 10 
status under a separate chain of 
command. The separate chains of 
command employed during Hurricane 
Katrina significantly degraded the 
integration and synchronization of more 
than 54,000 National Guard and 
20,000 Title 10 military personnel from 
different commands. National Guard 
and federal responses were coordinated 
across several chains of command but 
not integrated, which led to 
inefficiencies and duplication of effort. 
Without a means for integrating the 
response, no one had the total picture of 
the forces on the ground, the forces that 
were on the way, the missions that had 
been resourced, and the missions that 
still needed completion.1  
During Hurricane Katrina, National 
Guard forces from all states and 
territories were deployed to impacted 
states, and operated under the control of 
the respective impacted state’s adjutant 
general and governor. President Bush 
attempted to convince Governor Bush 
(FL), Governor Barber (MS), and 
Governor Blanco (LA) to give a state 
commission to Lieutenant General 
Russell Honore and place him in 
command of their respective National 
Guard forces, which would have placed 
the National Guard of the three states 
under federal command and control. All 
three Governors refused. 
Post-Katrina Failures to  
Integrate the Military Response  
Unfortunately, the lesson that DoD took 
from Hurricane Katrina was that DoD 
needed to have command and control 
over all military forces, including 
National Guard forces, during domestic 
emergencies. DoD believed that in major 
multi-state disasters such as Hurricane 
Katrina, the Department of Homeland 
Security needed authority to craft a 
prioritized and flexible response using 
all available resources, to include 
National Guard, federal forces, and non-
National Guard reserve forces. The DoD 
perspective was that during a multi-state 
event involving limited resources, 
centralized command and control would 
be needed to direct resources in 
accordance with a priority of effort 
strategy determined by the Lead Federal 
Agency. DoD’s solution was to propose 
legislation to allow the president to 
federalize the National Guard in 
domestic emergencies without the prior 
knowledge or consent of the governors. 
Although fifty-one governors signed a 
letter objecting to the changes when 
proposed, Congress passed the federal 
fiscal year 2007 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) which 
included DoD-drafted text amending the 
federal Insurrection Act to authorize the 
president to federalize the National 
Guard and mobilize all other military 
components to respond to “any serious 
emergency.” 
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The changes to the Insurrection Act 
infringed on the primary and sovereign 
responsibility of each state to prepare 
for and respond to 
disasters/emergencies within its 
borders. In the spring of 2007, the 
congressionally-chartered Commission 
on the National Guard and the Reserves 
issued an interim report stating 
Governors should be given the authority 
to control all military forces engaged in 
domestic operations within their 
respective states.  In its final report, the 
Commission stated: 
The Department of Defense disagreed 
with the Commission’s March 1 
recommendation to develop protocols 
that allow governors to direct the efforts 
of federal military assets responding to an 
emergency such as a natural disaster, and 
incorrectly suggested that such an 
approach is inconsistent with established 
law. In fact, similar protocols are 
employed routinely overseas when U.S. 
forces are placed under the command of a 
foreign commander. The process is fully 
consistent with law and precedent. The 
President, as commander in chief, can 
assign a task force of active duty forces as 
a supporting command to a state military 
joint task force while retaining ultimate 
command authority over those federal 
forces. This decision by the Department to 
reject the Commission’s recommendation, 
while offering no viable substitute, places 
the nation at risk of a disjointed federal 
and state military response to a 
catastrophe. 2 
Concurrently with the work of the 
Commission on the National Guard and 
Reserves, the governors unanimously 
advocated for the repeal of the changes 
to the Insurrection Act. The 2008 NDAA 
signed by the president on January 28, 
2008, repealed all of the 2007 NDAA 
changes to the Insurrection Act to which 
the governors had objected. 
Recognizing the ongoing lack of 
communication between DoD and the 
governors in this area and others, 
Congress took action. The creation of 
the Council of Governors was required 
by the National Guard Empowerment 
Act of 2007, passed by Congress as part 
of the 2008 NDAA. The act directed the 
president to establish a bipartisan 
council of ten governors, in order to 
provide governors a forum to exchange 
views on matters related to the National 
Guard and civil support missions with 
specified federal officials, including the 
secretary of defense, the secretary of 
homeland security, and the White 
House Homeland Security Council. 
In the absence of presidential action 
with regard to the establishment of the 
Council of Governors, DoD – again 
without consulting with governors – 
sought statutory authority in the 2009 
NDAA to federalize the National Guard 
and activate other reserve components 
for domestic operations. DoD’s efforts 
were unsuccessful with regard to the 
2009 NDAA. In the Joint Explanatory 
Statement submitted by the chairman 
and the ranking members of the House 
and Senate Committees on Armed 
Services regarding the 2009 NDAA, 
Congress recommended that DoD 
“engage with the community of 
governors to work out an understanding 
of unity of effort during domestic 
terrorist events and public 
emergencies.”3  The Statement noted 
that this issue must be addressed before 
Congress would consider legislation to 
implement any DoD proposal to permit 
the call-up of non-National Guard 
reservists to assist in responses to 
disasters. 
In the 2010 NDAA, DoD again 
attempted to increase its own authority 
to amass and employ significant military 
forces external to the control of the 
governors. In June of 2009, DoD 
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requested Congress grant the secretary 
of defense the authority to order non-
National Guard reserve component 
forces to active duty to assist in the 
response to a natural disaster or other 
emergency outside a terrorist attack. On 
August 7, 2009, Governor Manchin 
(WV) and Governor Jim Douglas (VT) 
sent a letter on behalf of the National 
Governors Association to DoD, stating 
in part that without assigning a governor 
the ability to control all military forces 
engaged in disaster response, “strong 
potential exists for confusion of mission 
execution and dilution of Governors’ 
control over situations with which they 
are more familiar and better capable of 
handling than a federal military 
commander.”4  As a result of the 
governors’ unified opposition, DoD was 
again unsuccessful in their legislative 
attempt to establish authorities for 
greater access to the reserves. 
The Council of Governors 
On January 11, 2010, President Obama 
issued an Executive Order establishing 
the Council of Governors, designating 
Governor Chris Gregoire (WA) and 
Governor Jim Douglas (VT) as co-chairs. 
The first plenary meeting of the Council 
was held on February 23, 2010. The 
Council established five working groups, 
and charged the Unity of Effort Working 
Group with addressing the proper 
integration of military forces during 
domestic operations. The Council made 
quick progress on issues through two 
additional plenary meetings in 2010, 
working group-specific workshops, and 
numerous conference calls. 
Representing a significant collaborative 
accomplishment, these efforts resulted 
in the proposal to employ dual status 
command for no-notice events, known 
then as the Contingency Dual Status 
Commander concept. The secretary of 
defense opened the policy door with his 
willingness to consider dual status 
command authorities to address the 
Governors’ concerns. This enabled the 
new commander of U.S. Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM), Admiral 
Winnefeld, to identify key middle 
ground, and shift course to a new vision 
on this critical issue.  
The significant progress made in a 
very short period of time was only 
possible through the support and 
partnership of all stakeholders, 
including the assistant secretary of 
defense for homeland defense and 
America’s security affairs, National 
Guard Bureau (NGB), and other offices 
within the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and DoD. The continuous 
support of the adjutants general to the 
Council of Governors throughout this 
process was instrumental. A proof-of-
concept tabletop was held in Florida on 
November 5, 2010, involving over sixty 
representatives from numerous 
agencies. The Lessons Learned from this 
event stated “[T]here is consensus 
among the exercise participants (Florida 
Division of Emergency Management, 
Florida National Guard, National Guard 
Bureau, US Northern Command, 
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency-Region IV and the Region IV 
Defense Coordinating Element) that the 
Dual Status Commander concept will 
improve Unity of Effort.” 5 
Dual Status Command during No-
Notice Events 
Employing a Dual Status Commander 
(DSC) during a no-notice event provides 
a cooperative and innovative approach 
to increase unity of effort and purpose 
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for state military and federal military 
support to states by establishing 
standardized procedures for 
commanding and integrating state and 
federal military forces for contingency, 
or no-notice, operations. The end result 
is an agreed upon command and control 
construct which eliminates the time 
consuming task of synchronizing 
organizational structures and processes 
under crisis conditions. This allows an 
increased focus on military operations to 
save lives, prevent human suffering, and 
mitigate great property damage. 
The concept of using a DSC for no-
notice events capitalizes on established 
procedures which have been successfully 
employed for pre-planned events since 
dual status command was made 
available in the 2004 NDAA. This 
unique command construct has been 
used eight times, at events such as the 
G8 Summit, the Democratic and 
Republican National Conventions, and 
Operation Winter Freeze (a 
northeastern-border security operation). 
Dual status command allows one 
commander to command both federal 
(Title 10) and state forces (National 
Guard in Title 32 and/or State Active 
Duty status) with the consent of a 
governor and the authorization of the 
president. This centralized command 
and control construct provides both the 
federal and state chains of command 
with a common operating picture 
through the eyes of the DSC. It also 
enables the DSC to maximize his or her 
federal and state capabilities, as well as 
facilitate unity of effort from all assigned 
forces. 
When utilizing a DSC, Title 10 forces 
and Title 32/State Active Duty forces 
have separate chains of command. 
Command authority within each of the 
separate chains of command may be 
exercised by the appointed DSC only 
through the separate chains of 
command. While acting pursuant to 
state authority, the DSC cannot issue 
orders to federal military forces; while 
acting pursuant to federal authority, the 
DSC cannot issue orders to state military 
forces. As such, the establishment of a 
DSC does not give the president 
command of state military forces, or the 
governor of a state command of federal 
military forces. The National Guard 
remains a state entity under the 
exclusive command and control of the 
governor, unless federalized, and the 
DSC has a state chain-of-command that 
reaches through the adjutant general, to 
the governor, and directs both Title 32 
and State Active Duty National Guard 
forces in response to the state mission. 
The president remains the commander-
in-chief of Title 10 forces, and the DSC 
has a federal chain-of-command that 
reaches through the NORTHCOM 
Commander, to the secretary of defense, 
to the president, and directs Title 10 
forces in response to federal requests for 
assistance (RFAs). 
National Guard officers are currently 
being pre-designated for appointment as 
DSCs for no-notice events. The 
adjutants general, coordinating through 
their governors, are nominating 
National Guard officers who are 
genuinely the best qualified. When 
federal military forces and state military 
forces are employed simultaneously in 
support of civil authorities in the United 
States, appointment of a National Guard 
DSC would be the usual and customary 
command and control arrangement. 
Actual appointment of the DSC 
following a no-notice event will continue 
to require the approval and consent of 
the president and the appropriate 
governor. In order for pre-designated 
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DSCs to be quickly available to respond 
to a contingency, required proper 
consent and authorization memoranda 
of agreement are being pre-coordinated 
and maintained ready for signature. 
Specialized training and certification 
to command U.S. military forces in 
support of civil authorities will enable 
the DSC to improve unity of effort, 
ensuring a rapid response to save lives, 
prevent human suffering, and protect 
property in the United States. 
NORTHCOM, through NGB and with 
the military departments, worked with 
the adjutants general to develop a 
standardized training and certification 
program for DSC candidates. In addition 
to training and certification, DSCs are 
expected to participate in regular joint 
exercises involving state and federal 
civilian and military personnel. 
In order to support a DSC during a 
no-notice event involving both National 
Guard and Title 10 forces, NORTHCOM 
is pre-designating Title 10 officers to 
serve as the federal or Title 10 Deputy 
Commander. The Title 10 Deputy 
Commander’s responsibility is to ensure 
proper execution of the DSC’s orders to 
Title 10 forces and to act as an advisor to 
the DSC on Title 10 matters. Title 10 
Deputy Commanders will establish close 
and habitual relationships with the pre-
designated DSCs, engage senior state 
leaders, and develop close working 
relationships within their assigned 
states and other key partners. 
NORTHCOM has also developed a 
scaleable and tailorable Title 10 staff 
element, called the Joint Support Force 
(JSF). The JSF utilizes trained, 
experienced, and deployable staff 
elements to work directly for the DSC, 
integrate with the state National Guard 
staff, and support the federal military 
response. The JSF will, when feasible 
and requested by the states, participate 
in state-level exercises to hone 
integration with the pre-designated DSC 
and state structures. The development of 
implementation plans for staff 
integration of Title 10 personnel into 
state Joint Task Force and Joint Force 
Headquarters will address several 
employment considerations, including 
ensuring effective mission assignment to 
both Title 10 and state military forces 
given the restriction of Posse Comitatus, 
the development of associated 
supporting Rules on the Use of Force, 
and maintaining procedures for 
reporting federal mission status through 
federal chains of command. For 
example, leaders must be aware that 
military forces supporting a federal 
Mission Assignment are limited by the 
scope of that Mission Assignment. 
Command and control options must be 
scalable from small footprints (when 
Title 10 forces are contributed to a 
disaster, 95 percent of the time the Title 
10 force is less than a battalion, 
requiring a small JSF staff element), to 
very large (possible integration of U.S. 
Army North’s Contingency Command 
Post as a large JSF). 
Pre-event planning for the 
employment of a joint force will reap 
significant dividends in terms of 
increasing the effectiveness of the 
military response. For example, 
tremendous efficiencies will be realized 
in logistics, including the joint 
reception, staging, onward movement 
and integration (JRSOI) of forces. 
Inadequate control of this strategic 
movement results in a loss of potential 
capabilities and capacities. The DSC 
construct is the vehicle which will enable 
the long-sought coordinated and 
synchronized planning effort by joint 
Title 10 and Title 32/State Active Duty 
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organizations in advance of an incident. 
The DSC construct will also result in 
progress with regard to development of 
additional pre-scripted mission 
assignments (PSMA). PSMA contain 
pre-agreed language about those federal 
capabilities that are expected to be 
requested in a Stafford Act-declared 
major disaster or emergency. The 
development of additional PMSA, 
beyond the twenty-seven currently 
established with DoD, will streamline 
the process and reduce the time it takes 
to deploy military resources for many 
contingency scenarios. 
DSC Employment during Multi-
State Incidents  
To date, all but one (i.e., Operation 
Winter Freeze, November 2, 2004, to 
January 28, 2005) of the eight instances 
in which a DSC was appointed involved 
operations in a single state. It is highly 
likely that our nation will face a 
catastrophic incident affecting multiple 
states simultaneously. A multiple state 
response gives rise to several challenges, 
including ensuring limited resources are 
appropriately shared among states 
during a regional event, in accordance 
with priorities established by states and 
a Lead Federal Agency. Some have 
argued that establishing a single DSC 
with multi-state authorities and 
responsibilities could assist in 
centralizing the interstate coordination 
of limited federal resources. During 
disasters/emergencies affecting multiple 
states simultaneously, the proper 
solution is to employ a DSC in each 
state. 
Any multi-state DSC construct would 
immediately conflict with the 
responsibilities of governors for the 
welfare of the citizens of their states for 
several reasons. All agree that limited 
resources must be allocated in an 
expeditious manner to the affected state 
with the most urgent requirements. Title 
10 forces are requested, sourced, 
deployed, and employed using the 
existing Request for Assistance/Mission 
Assignment process. When there are not 
enough resources to go around at the 
local, state, or federal levels, allocation 
decisions are made by civilian 
emergency management personnel at 
those levels in coordination with elected 
officials at those levels. Arbitration of 
civilian response requirements is not 
properly a military decision, either at 
the state military or federal military 
levels. Federal military forces are 
committed in accordance with the 
priorities of the Joint Field Office 
Unified Coordination Group locally and 
by the Lead Federal Agency nationally. 
If there are not enough federal military 
resources to meet the requirements of 
every state simultaneously, 
prioritization should continue to be 
performed using existing structures and 
processes, regardless of the command 
and control relationships used to 
integrate the military forces assigned to 
each state. For example, if there are 
Joint Field Offices established in several 
states, these requests can be prioritized 
in a multi-state Area Command. 
A multi-state DSC charged with 
prioritizing resources between states 
would be in the immediately untenable 
position of being in conflict with the 
Lead Federal Agency, the federal 
coordinating official, and the governors 
of the several states. As a practical 
matter, the DSC will be from one of the 
states, and any appearance of favoritism 
will immediately end the effectiveness of 
a multi-state DSC. Further, state Joint 
Force Headquarters are optimized to 
SCH UM ACH ER , DU AL -ST A T U S  COM M AND  8 
HO M E L A N D  SE C U R IT Y  AFFA IRS , VO L U M E  7, AR T IC L E  4 (FEBRUARY  2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
perform their domestic operations 
planning and operations in support of a 
specific state’s emergency management 
structures and governor. National Guard 
domestic operations staffs are highly 
evolved for domestic operations within 
their state. A multi-state integrated 
National Guard/Title 10 staff would 
have the immediate challenge of being 
responsive in different states with 
distinct supported civilian structures, 
missions, authorities, funding, and other 
issues. Determining which states are 
assigned limited federal resources 
should be accomplished exactly as it is 
now, regardless of military command 
and control structure. 
 
The DSC as a Foundation for 
Future Progress  
Successful implementation of the DSC 
construct for no-notice events is likely to 
provide a necessary prerequisite for 
resolving an important gap in the law 
that limits our ability to use all our 
nation’s military capabilities. Federal 
law currently limits the ability of the 
president or the secretary of defense to 
mobilize non-National Guard reservists 
for natural disasters. During Council of 
Governor proceedings, several 
governors have gone on record stating 
that when they are guaranteed control of 
military forces operating in their state, 
including non-National Guard reserve 
forces, at that time they would be willing 
to support new authorities allowing 
increased availability of non-National 
Guard reservists for disaster response. 
Approving the DSC concept for no-
notice events therefore will resolve the 
impasse of governor support for 
congressional action with regard to 
enacting legislation to allow 
mobilization of non-National Guard 
reservists to help in natural disaster 
response.  
CONCLUSION 
The DSC compromise being 
developed through the Council of 
Governors will dramatically reshape 
how the U.S. military responds to an 
emergency involving both state and 
federal forces, whether our nation has 
prior notice of the event or not, enabling 
the most effective, most coordinated use 
of military forces for domestic 
contingencies. Anytime there is a 
response to an emergency involving 
both state and federal military forces, a 
National Guard DSC will normally be 
appointed to simultaneously direct the 
operations of both National Guard and 
federal forces. During multi-state 
events, a DSC should be appointed in 
each impacted state to enable effective 
and coordinated military response 
throughout all impacted areas. These 
effects will be achieved while fully 
adhering to the sovereign status of the 
governors in managing and directing 
emergencies within their states and 
territories and the responsibility of the 
president in ensuring legal, safe, and 
effective employment of federal forces. 
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